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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
vVAL TER CORBET,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11910

ARTA 0. CORBET,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for dissolution of a partnership
and for a partnership accounting.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court below entered judgment for plaintiff,
ordering dissolution of the partnership and accounting
for the alleged assets of the partnership as requested
by plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant agrees that the partnership should be
dissolved but contends that the court below erred as to
the terms of the partnership agreement and requests
that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded
for findings and judgment consistent with the true terms
of the partnership agreement.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married December
28, 1954, at Las Vegas, Nevada, both having been
married previously. The parties were divorced by decree of the Sixth District Court for Sanpete County,
which decree became final December 28, 1962.
Although the time of reconciliation is disputed,
sometime between November, 1962, and March, 1963,
the parties decided to resume the marriage relationship
and for that purpose filed a petition to set aside the
decree of divorce. The Sixth District Court set aside
the decree on April 8, 1963, and the parties lived thereafter as husband and wife until sometime prior to July,
1968, when defendant commenced an action for divorce.
The divorce action was dismissed November 21, 1968,
on the ground that the order setting aside the previous
divorce decree was a nullity.
It is agreed that during the period following the
reconciliation until defendant filed for divorce in July,
1968, the parties regarded themselves as husband and
wife and were engaged during part of that period in
a partnership, the exact scope and terms of which are
in dispute.

According to plaintiff, the partnership commenced
with the reconciliation and extended to all of the previously separate property of plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiff's calculations as to the respective capital con·
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tributions of the parties to the partnership are shown
on Exhibit 3.
Defendant's calculation of the partnership capital
account is shown on Exhibit 21.
It will be seen from a comparison of plaintiff's and
defendant's calculations of the capital account that the
chief dispute centers about whether the so-called "Sterling Ranch" and a joint account of the parties at the
Manti City Bank were or were not assets of the partnership.
It is plaintiff's position that the partnership agreement was oral and was entered into at the time of reconciliation in March, 1963. (R.l)
Defendant contends that the partnership agreement was reduced to writing in April, 1965, that it related only to the trailer sales business which parties
entered into in the spring of 1964 in St. George, Washington County, Utah, and that the said written agreement provided for a monthly wage of $300.00 to be
paicl to the defendant. ( R.11) According to defendant,
the $300.00 monthly wage was to be retained in the
partnership as a capital contribution from defendant
and appears as such on Exhibit 21.
It is the purpose of this brief to demonstrate to
this Court that the trial court erred in finding that the
evidence supported plaintiff's view of these disputed
matters.
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ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I
THIS ACTION FOR PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING
IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE AND APPEAL MAY BE
MADE ON QUESTIONS OF FACT AS WELL AS LAW.

The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9
provides with respect to appeals from the district courts
to the Supreme Court that
"In equity cases, the appeal may be on questions
of both law and fact ... " Cf. Stone v. Stone, 19
Utah 2d 378, 431 P.2d 802(1967).
That an action seeking an accounting is equitable
m nature is universally held and the Utah Supreme
Court has expressly so recognized in Bear River State
Bank v. Merrill, 101Utah176, 120 P.2d 325(1941).
As the Court stated in that case,
"And where it is claimed that the facts found by
the trial court are not supported by the evidence,
the appellants are entitled to a full review of the
evidence and a determination by the Supreme
Court." 120 P.2d 327.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO WRITTEN PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PAR TIES.

In the spring of 1965, the parties hired one Lanny
Lund to manage the trailer sales lot in St. George during the summer of that year. Defendant testified that
in April of 1965, she prepared a draft of a partnership
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agreement (Exhibit 1 ) and that from that written draft
Mr. Lund prepared a typewritten agreement. She further testified that the typewritten document was signed
by herself and plaintiff in the presence of a notary public,
Mrs. Lillian Covington. (R.125-32)
Mr. Lund confirmed the testimony of defendant
and added that he recalled specifically the provision for
the payment of a monthly salary of $300.00 to defendant. (R.138)
The notary, Mrs. Covington, also confirmed
testimony of Mrs. Corbet, specifically recalling
stationary on which the agreement was typed and
circumstances under which it was brought to her
notarization. (R.154-48)

the
the
the
for

The further evidence was that the typewritten,
signed and notarized agreement was placed in a metal
box belonging to plaintiff and retained by him. ( R.511 )
Plaintiff sought to discredit the written draft of
the agreement, offered in evidence by defendant pursuant to Section 78-25-16(2) Utah Code Annotated
( 1953), on the ground that the date of the draft was
tampered with between the time of defendant's deposition and the trial. To support this argument, plaintiff
introduced in evidence a faded machine copy of the
draft made at the time of the deposition (Exhibit 29)
which does not show the tear in the area of the date
which now appears on the original. It is apparent, how-
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ever, that the difference between the copy and the
original is to be accounted for by the failure of the
machine to reproduce any of the tears on the margin
of the document.
There was also conflicting expert evidence as to
the date of the document. (Exhibits 38, 40) The expert evidence is, however, inconclusive and represents
mere conflicting speculations.
Thus, the only substantial evidence produced by
plaintiff to deny the existence of a written partnership
agreement as alleged by defend ant was plaintiff's own
self serving denials. When these are balanced against
the strong testimony of two independent witnesses, Mr.
Lund and Mrs. Covington, it is clear that the trial court
acted contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
m holding for the plaintiff on this issue.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SEPARATE
PROPERTY

OF DEFENDANT

CONSTITUTED ASSETS

OF THE PARTNERSHIP.

Central to plaintiff's case is the contention that the
joint bank account in the Manti City Bank and defendant's ranch at Sterling constituted assets of the partner·
ship.
A. BANK ACCOUNT -

MANTI CITY BANK

As to plaintiff's contention that the Manti City
Bank account was a partnership account, it is a suffic-
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ient rebuttal to note, as conceded by plaintiff in his
Exhibit 7, that this account was used by defendant for
deposits and disbursements of monies to her children
which by no stretch of the imagination could have had
anything to do with an alleged partnership existing during the years 1963-64. It was defendant's testimony
that plaintiff's name was added to the account in the
I\1anti City Bank at his request over her objections.
( R. 4 76) Defendant further testified that the understanding with respect to the account was that the funds
deposited in the account should be used for their living
expenses and that if and when they were able to find
a location for a trailer sales lot, money would be taken
from the account to commence such business. (R. 477)
In fact, the sum of $1,351.64 was transferred from the
Manti City Bank account to the partnership account
opened in the Bank of St. George in connection with
the establishment of the partnership in the spring of
1964. That the Manti account was not a partnership
account is further evidenced by the fact that a separate
partnership account was established in St. George.
Plaintiff's contention that the Manti City Bank account was a partnership account is thus without merit
or support in the evidence.
B.

STERLING RANCH

As to plaintiff's contention that the Sterling Ranch
was a partnership asset, it is clear that the ranch was
a part of defendant's deceased husband's estate, that
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the record title has always remained with her or members of her immediate family and had never been vested
in plaintiff, and that defendant never had any intention
of giving to plaintiff any interest in the said ranch property. Defendant's testimony and the chain of title both
indicate that she regarded herself as holding the property in trust for her children. This is supported by the
fact that she transferred title to the children in 1962
and received back a deed later in that year which she
did not record until 1965 when she sold the property
and gave part of the proceeds to the children. ( R. 4 7884, Exhibit 30) Plaintiff's declarations to the contrary
are self serving, without substantial support in the evidence and clearly inconsistent with the limited scope
of the partnership as evidenced by the written agreement entered into by the parties in April, 1965.
C. MORTGAGE INTEREST OF WALTER

Additional evidence that the partnership did not
include the "separate properties" of the parties is found
in the fact that a mortgage obligation due plaintiff from
his son was released by plaintiff in 1965 unilaterally
and without consulting plaintiff. (R. 274, Exhibits 41,
42). Plaintiff's position thus becomes in effect, "what's
yours is mine, and what's mine is mine." That the
trial court could so find is further evidence of its utter
disregard of the facts.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT WITH
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DEFENDANT TO TRANSFER HER REAL PROPERTY TO
THE

PARTNERSHIP

VIOLATES

THE

STATUTE

OF

FRAUDS AND IS UNENFORCEABLE.

The Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1 Utah Code
Annotated ( 1969 Repl. Vol.) provides:
"No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing."
An exception to the statute is recognized for parol
grants under limited circumstances:
"It must appear by evidence that is clear, convincing, and unequivocal: ( 1 ) that there was a parol
grant or gift by a contract or agreement which
must be complete and certain in its terms; ( 2)
possession taken and improvements made by the
donee pursuant to and in reliance upon such oral
gift; ( 3) that the improvements so made are substantial, and, not as an absolute rule but as a guiding principle, that the value thereof be in excess of
the rental value during the time of occupancy; and
(4) strong equities in favor of the donee, so strong
that it would amount to a fraud upon him to allow
the statute to be interposed to defeat his claim ...
The requisite of clear conclusive and unequivical
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evidence is especially important in the case of a
parol gift of land, since the fact that the parties
are usually relatives tends to account for plaintiff's
occupation of the land as permissive, not as the
result of contract. The proof must indicate more
than a vague intention to give, or a family arrangement resting upon the will of the parties." Boland
v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P.7, 10(1930).
Clearly, however, no such unambiguous state of facts
supports plaintiff's claim to the "Sterling Ranch" as a
partnership asset.
POINT V
THE RECORD TITLE OF THE RANCH PROPERTY
CREATES A REBUTT ABLE PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP WHICH PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET.

Furthermore, it is a proposition beyond dispute
that the record title constitutes presumptive evidence
of the ownership of the ranch and, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, is conclusive. Hawe
v. Hawe, 89 Idaho 367, 406 P.2d 106 ( 1965); In re
Capolino, 94 Cal. App.2d 574, 210 P.2d 850(1949).
"The rule is well settled that one who would claim
the ownership of property of which the legal title
stands of record in another . . . must establish such
claim by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and
convincing." 210 P.2d 852.
The only evidence introduced by plaintiff to support
his claim was his own self serving declaration that de·
f endant agreed to convey the property to the alleged
partnership. In finding the ranch to be a partnership
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asset, the trial court erred both in fact and in law.
POINT VI
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SO
VAGUE AS TO BE INCAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION
WITHOUT FURTHER LITIGATION.

The calculations upon which the trial court based
its judgment as to the distribution of the alleged parnership assets are identical with those of plaintiff's settlement proposal. (Exhibit 19) First, the judgment
adds the current value of the alleged assets ( $82,850.32),
including the proceeds of the sale by defendant of her
separately owned ranch property. The alleged contributions of the parties ( $63,030.54) are then deducted
to give a net profit figure ($19,819.78). One half
($9,909.89) of the net profit is then added to the parties' respective contributions (Walter, $34, 128.14; Arta
$28,902.40) to arrive at their respective distributive
shares (Walter, $44,038.03; Arta, $38,812.29). But from
Arta's distributive share the judgment subtracts the proceeds from the sale of the ranch and an alleged overpayment from the drawing account. The judgment
then proceeds to decree distribution "in accordance with"
this calculation, declaring a "balance due" plaintiff and
defendant of $44,038.03 and $1,862.29 respectively.
Wholly apart from the manifest disregard of the
facts shown by this calculation, it shows a total indifference to the practical problems of settling the affairs
of the partnership. Although the judgment calls for a
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distribution of assets having a value of approximately
$46,000.00 it provides no method to determine the
respective interest of the parties in the several properties ..
For example, it is agreed that the St. George sales
lot was an asset of the partnership. That business consisted primarily of a leasehold interest in the land upon
which the business was conducted, an option to buy said
land and inventory. ( R.45) The option is the subject
of litigation between the parties to this lawsuit as plaintiffs and the optionor as defendant (Corbett v. Cox,
Case No. 3877, Fifth District Court, Washington County) . The judgment includes "St. George business and
lot subject to $5,000.00 option and expense of lawsuit
on same" as an asset of the partnership with a value
of $32,000.00. It should be noted that the judgment is
in error in speaking of a "lot" as a partnership asset,
since the parties hold only a leasehold interest. But
more importantly the judgment makes no provision for
distribution of the said assets. Is the trailer sales business
to be liquidated and the proceeds distributed pro rata
in proportion to the "balance due'' each party? Or is
plaintiff to receive the entire business including the
greatly appreciated value of the option, the substantial
good will and going concern value of the business (one
of which is included in the Court's valuation) by simply
paying defendant her "balance due" of $1,862.29? Con·
versely, can defendant claim the business by paying
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plaintiff his $44,038.03 "distributive share"? The judgment simply fails to consider the crucial problem of
how this property is to be divided.
Another example of the practical impossibility of
implementing the judgment relates to the so-called
Peacock House. This house was purchased by defendant with separate funds which she regarded as belonging to her children. Title to the property was taken in
the names of Walter and the two daughters of Arta,
each having an undivided one-third interest. Defendant
testified that one-third interest was given to Walter because she thought the parties were married. There was
no intention to make the property a partnership asset.
(R.497-99). The judgment of the trial court includes
the entire property as an asset of the partnership and
completely disregards the means by which the interest
of the two daughters is to be determined or partitioned
and their claims upon the property discharged.

It is plain from the foregoing that the judgment
is incapable of implementation in its present form and
that to hold the parties to its terms is inevitably to invite further litigation.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing does not purport to be a discussion
of all the complex facts or even of all those facts which
are in dispute. Defendant will, however, spare this
Court extensive reference to the voluminous record.
It is apparent that the trial court committed sub-
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stantial error with respect to those issues discussed above.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the
position of defendant on all these disputed issues. In
particular, the evidence shows that there was a written
partnership agreement pursuant to which defendant was
to have been paid $300.00 per month for her services in
the St. George sales lot and which limited the activities
of the partnership to that business. Further, the sole
assets of the partnership were those contributions made
by the parties directly to the St. George trailer sales
business and did not include the "Sterling Ranch" or
the Manti City Bank account except for the $1,351.64
transferred to the St. George account.
Defendant respectfully requests that in light of the
foregoing, the Court set aside the judgment of the court
below and remand this case for findings of fact and
conclusions of law in conformity with the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

Jackson Howard, for:
HOWARD AND LEWIS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
and
TIBBS AND TERVORT
Manti, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant

